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HINTS OF THE FUTURE?: JOHN ROBERTS, JR.'S 
FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES AS 
AN APPELLATE JUDGE 
Thomas K. Clancyt 
Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. had a thin paper trail prior to his 
appointment to the Supreme Court. He has, however, more of a re-
cord in Fourth Amendment1 jurisprudence from his brief time as a 
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. How a Supreme Court Justice interprets the Fourth Amendment 
is perhaps one of the most important tasks of the position, given the 
countless times that the Amendment is implicated each day2 and the 
large number of Fourth Amendment cases that reach the Supreme 
Court each year. 3 The docket of the D.C. Circuit has a significant 
number of criminal cases because of its location in the nation's capital 
and the substantial number of criminal cases pursued in its federal 
courts.4 As a D.C. Circuit judge, Judge Roberts sat on eight cases in-
volving Fourth Amendment issues that resulted in published opin-
ions.5 Of those cases, he authored four for the court and issued one 
t Director, National Center for justice and the Rule of Law, and Visiting 
Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law. Copyright © 2005, 
Thomas K. Clancy. 
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. For example, there are approximately 20 million vehicle stops each year. 
See Lawrence A. Greenfield, Foreword to U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY POLICE, 1999, 
at iii (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cdsp99. 
htm. Similarly, there are millions of airport screenings each year, each of 
which must be justified as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See 
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS 2005 
tb1.2-16a (2005), available at http://www.bts.gov/. 
3. See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 497, 507-
09 (2004). See generally SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2003 YEAR-
END REpORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, (2004), http://www.supremecourt 
us.gov/. 
4. Special Repvrt, Repvrt of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D. C. 
Circuit TaskForce on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 189, 
193-94 (1996). 
5. See infra Part I. 
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notable dissent.6 He joined the opinion of the court in the three re-
maining caSeS without authoring an opinion.' This essay examines 
those opinions and, in the manner of reading tea-leaves, seeks to 
reach some conclusions on his views of the Fourth Amendment. 
I. THE CASES 
A. United States v. Lawson 
Writing for the court in United States v. Lawson,s in an appeal from 
convictions of aggravated bank robbery and brandishing a firearm 
during a crime of violence, Judge Roberts concluded that the search 
of an automobile that yielded incriminating evidence against Lawson 
was proper.9 The district court had rejected Lawson's claim on the 
ground that Lawson did not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.l0 Judge Roberts, for the court of appeals, chose to "affirm on a 
different ground-that the search of the Oldsmobile was supported 
by probable cause."ll This was despite the fact that the government 
had not argued that probable cause justified the search in the lower 
court;12 instead, the government raised the issue for the first time in 
its appellate brief. In finding probable cause for the seizure and for 
conducting the subsequent search, Judge Roberts asserted that the ve-
hicle matched the physical description of the getaway car in a bank 
robbery that the police were investigating: "Four out of five numbers 
on the temporary license plate matched a witness account of the get-
away car's tags. Further, prior to seizing the car, agents 'saw some 
latex gloves laying in the right front passenger area.' "13 Based on 
those circumstances, he concluded, "it was reasonable for agents to 
believe the vehicle contained contraband or instrumentalities of 
crime."14 
B. United States v. Jackson 
Judge Roberts's only dissent came in United States v. jackson,15 de-
cidedJuly 22, 2005, which was three days after Judge Roberts's nomi-
nation to the U.S. Supreme Court. The sole basis for Judge Roberts's 
dissent was purportedly factual: he believed that the information avail-
able to the police constituted probable cause to search the trunk,16 
6. See infra Parts I.A.-I.C., I.E.-I.F. 
7. See infra Part I.D. 
8. 4lO F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
9. Id. at 740-41. 
10. Id. at 740. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 740 n.4. 
13. Id. at 741 (citation omitted). 
14. Id. 
15. 415 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
16. Id. at lO5-06 (Roberts, j., dissenting). 
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although the majority concluded there was insufficient justification 
for the searchP However, underlying the majority's and dissent's ap-
proaches were fundamental disagreements on how a court should ap-
proach probable cause determinations. 
The facts were as follows: 
1) "At approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 4,2002, United States Park 
Police Officers Jeffrey Garboe and Wayne Johnson observed a 
1988 Mercury Marquis without a functioning tag light."18 
2) The officers stopped the vehicle because of the absence of the 
tag light. 19 
3) Prior to approaching the car, the police conducted a records 
check, which indicated that the car's temporary license tags 
had been reported stolen.20 
4) The officers arrested the driver, Tarry M. Jackson, for the sto-
len tag offense.21 
5) Because Jackson was unable to produce registration or a 
driver's license, the officers conducted a more thorough 
records check, which indicated that his driving privileges were 
suspended in Virginia.22 
6) "The officers also checked the vehicle identification number in 
a computer database, and it yielded an 'old listing' from Vir-
ginia, meaning that the car had once been registered there but 
that it was not currently registered."23 
7) "There was no report that the car had been stolen."24 
8) The officers searched the passenger compartment of the car 
for documentation of ownership, but "did not find any docu-
mentation, contraband, or evidence of criminal activity."25 
9) One of the officers, Officer Garboe, testified that, on approxi-
mately ten previous occasions relating to vehicle stops involving 
stolen tags, he had found the vehicle's real tags in the trunk six 
or seven times.26 
10) Mter securing the driver, the officers searched the trunk and 
recovered a loaded .25 caliber pistol and ammunition.27 
11) At some point, Jackson claimed that the car belonged to his 
girlfriend and that she had bought it at an auction a month 
earlier. 28 
17. Id. at 89-90. 
18. Id. at 94-95. 







26. Id. at 102. 
27. Id. at 90. 
28. Id. 
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Supreme Court precedent has established that, although the pas-
senger compartment of a vehicle can be searched incident to the 
driver's arrest,29 a trunk in the vehicle cannot be searched. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court has also established that such a trunk 
search is permitted, without a warrant, when the police have probable 
cause to believe that the trunk has evidence of the crime.30 
A threejudge panel heard the appeal in Jackson: Judge Judith W. 
Rogers wrote the opinion for the court; Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote 
a concurring opinion, which seemed to comprehensively address the 
case and had significantly different reasoning than Rogers's opinion, 
making the "majority" opinion a curious one; and Judge Roberts dis-
sented.31 Rogers's opinion set forth the traditional standard for prob-
able cause and correctly observed that, given that this was a 
warrantless search, the government had the burden of proof.32 Rog-
ers then proceeded to reject the various governmental theories justifY-
ing the search, before settling in on the question upon which she 
believed the case turned: Whether there was probable cause to believe 
"that documentation demonstrating that the driver was not author-
ized to drive the car would be in the trunk."33 Rogers believed that 
the circumstances known to the police at the time of the trunk search 
did not support the view that Jackson was an unauthorized driver.34 
She serially rejected the computer record checks, the fruitless search 
of the passenger compartment, the suspended driver's license, the 
driving late at night, the broken tag light, and the lack of registration 
as affecting the probability that Jackson was an unauthorized user. 35 
She believed that the stolen tags were the "critical feature" of the traf-
fic stop.36 Rejecting that feature, Rogers stated that there were only 
three reasons why the stolen tags would be on the car: 
First, stolen tags may be placed on an otherwise lawfully used 
car without tags to give the appearance of legitimate tags and 
therefore to reduce the risk that the police will initiate a traf-
fic stop for lack of tags. Second, stolen tags may be used to 
replace expired tags on an otherwise lawfully used vehicle, 
again in the hope of avoiding immediate detection. The lack 
of registration and the absence of a report that the car was 
29. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981) (holding that 
incident to an arrest of an automobile occupant, police may search only the 
interior passenger compartment of the automobile). 
30. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991) (interpreting 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925), to provide that police 
may search an automobile and its containers if they have probable cause to 
believe that contraband or evidence is contained therein). 
31. Jackson, 415 F.3d at 88, 98-101. 
32. Id. at 91-92. 
33. Id. at 92-93. 
34. Id. at 94. 
35. Id. at 93-94. 
36. Id. at 94. 
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stolen are consistent with these first two rationales, which 
suggest that the driver was an authorized user of the car. 
Third, stolen tags may be used to conceal the fact that a vehi-
cle is stolen by replacing the stolen vehicle's "real tags." ... 
Because the officers here were confronted with three possi-
ble explanations for the presence of the stolen tags on the 
car, two of which suggested authorized use and were consis-
tent with the lack of registration and the absence of a report 
that the car was stolen, and only one of which supported an 
inference of unauthorized use, the officers lacked probable 
cause to search the trunk for documentation that the driver 
was an unauthorized user of the car. 
While the existence of probable cause does not depend on 
the elimination of all innocent explanations for a situation, 
our dissenting colleague ... posits the most incriminating 
interpretation of the circumstances, as though the existence 
of countervailing probabilities was irrelevant. Were that the 
law, then the government's burden would be considerably 
eased, for the particular circumstances causing the police to 
make a traffic stop could often be viewed most negatively 
without regard to a citizen's Fourth Amendment protections. 
Our dissenting colleague emphasizes that Officer Garboe 
also testified that on six or seven occasions he had encoun-
tered vehicles with stolen tags that had "real tags" or other 
identifying information in the trunk . . . . Even if there was 
probable cause to believe that the trunk would contain the 
car's expired "real tags," these tags, like a tool kit, are neither 
contraband nor evidence of a crime because there is nothing 
illegal about having such tags in the trunk of an unregistered 
car. In overlooking this point, our dissenting colleague 
posits an evidentiary inference based on finding "real tags" 
in the trunk that is irrelevant in the absence of probable 
cause to believe that the trunk contained contraband or evi-
dence of a crime. Further, the record does not indicate that 
the car's expired "real tags" would provide the officers with 
any additional information regarding the ownership of the 
car because a records check based on the vehicle identifica-
tion number indicated only an "old listing." In any event, 
even if "real tags" or identifying information could in some 
instances constitute contraband or evidence of a crime, the 
officer's prior experience of finding such information in a 
vehicle trunk, while relevant, is unhelpful here because his 
testimony is devoid of the critical circumstances of those 
searches, including whether the identifying information re-
vealed that the vehicle was stolen.37 
37. [d. at 94-95 (citation omitted). 
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Judge Rogers added some advice for the police: Instead of search-
ing the truck, she opined, the police should have continued their in-
vestigation by questioning Jackson "to determine whether it would be 
reasonable to conclude that documentation of the driver's unautho-
rized use of the car would be in the trunk."38 She opined that Jackson 
had been cooperative.39 
Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion, rejected the contention 
that the police had reason to believe that the car was stolen "because 
the police officers knew that the car was unregistered and that it had not 
been reported stolen."40 He reasoned: 
If a car is not registered, then it has no legitimate tags. 
The most reasonable inference to be drawn in this situation 
is that the owner has placed stolen tags on the car to avoid 
being stopped for driving without tags, while avoiding the 
expense attendant to registering the car and obtaining legiti-
mate tags. In other words, if a car has no legitimate tags be-
cause it is unregistered, then police officers have no good 
reason to assume that the stolen tags are intended to conceal 
the true identity of the vehicleY 
Edwards's opinion also discussed the importance of the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantees and the duties of judges to jealously guard 
the rights of individuals.42 Judge Roberts, dissenting, replied: 
I wholeheartedly subscribe to the sentiments expressed in 
the concurring opinion about the Fourth Amendment's place 
among our most prized freedoms. But sentiments do not de-
cide cases; facts and the law do. There is no dispute here on 
the law: if the officers had probable cause, they did not need 
a warrant; if they did not have probable cause, no warrant 
would issue in any event. As for the facts, the officers en-
countered at 1 :00 a.m. an unlicensed driver operating an un-
registered car with a broken tag light and stolen tags. The 
experienced district court judge concluded-and I agree-
that "the circumstances were suspicious enough to amount 
to probable cause to search the trunk." Right or wrong, 
nothing about that determination reflected insensitivity to 
constitutional values, any more than a contrary determina-
tion would have reflected insensitivity to the needs of law 
enforcemen t. 43 
Earlier in his opinion, Judge Roberts demonstrated that he not only 
disputed the importance of the facts but that his view of the tools to 
38. Id. at 96. 
39. Id. at 97. 
40. Id. at 100 (Edwards, j., concurring). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 100-01 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961». 
43. Id. at 105-06 (Roberts, j., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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measure probable cause differed markedly from the majority. Judge 
Roberts viewed the facts together: 
It was late at night and the tag light was out-suggesting 
from the beginning of the encounter that Jackson was at-
tempting to obscure the car's license plates. Once Jackson 
was pulled over, the officers learned there was indeed some-
thing to hide: the temporary tags affixed to the car had been 
stolen and altered to match the car's make, model, and vehi-
cle identification number.44 
He made inferences from those facts, based on prior case law45 and 
the experience of the officers:46 
Stolen tags often accompany stolen cars. The reason is ob-
vious: by replacing the real tags with stolen tags, the thief 
makes it impossible for police to identify a stolen vehicle by 
sight. A stolen vehicle will normally be described by its 
make, model, and license plate number. An officer cruising 
the streets cannot readily identify a particular Mercury Mar-
quis as the stolen Mercury Marquis if the original tags have 
been replaced. So the stolen tags raised a suspicion that the 
car may have been stolen as well.47 
Judge Roberts believed that the records check added to the police's 
suspicion: 
To the officers on the scene, ... the failure of the records 
check to resolve ownership of the vehicle was unusual. The 
fact that Jackson was not listed on the car's last registration 
could reasonably have heightened the officers' suspicion: 
now they were dealing not only with a car with stolen tags, 
but with a car that had no recorded connection to Jackson.48 
Turning specifically to why the search of the trunk was reasonable, 
Judge Roberts observed: 
One of the officers at the scene would later testify that he 
had made about ten previous vehicle stops involving stolen 
tags. On six or seven of those occasions, he had found the 
vehicle's real tags in the trunk. This is not especially surpris-
ing: the trunk is certainly a convenient place to stash the real 
44. Id. at 101. 
45. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690, 692 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that the defendants traveled in a stolen car with stolen plates). 
46. Jackson, 415 F.3d at 101. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d 1170, 
1172 (D.C. 1993) (referring to police officer's comment that stolen plates 
often accompany stolen vehicles). 
47. Jackson, 415 F.3d at 101 (citation omitted). 
48. Id. at 101-02 (citing to Officer Garboe's statement: "Normally if you run [a 
registration check] having already run the operator, it'll tell you that it 
comes back with an expired listing to that operator. And that was not the case 
in this case.") (citation omitted). 
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tags once they have been removed from the back of the vehi-
cle. Real tags in the trunk would clearly be probative evi-
dence suggesting the car was stolen, for the reason just 
noted: car thieves replace the real tags with stolen ones to 
help avoid detection.49 
Judge Roberts noted that there could have been other evidence in 
the trunk tending to show who the real owner was or supporting the 
view that Jackson stole the vehicle.50 Finally,Judge Roberts viewed the 
permissible inferences from the facts known to the police much differ-
ently than his colleagues. First, because the car was unregistered did 
not mean that the vehicle's license plates disappeared once its regis-
tration lapsed.51 He asserted that many people receive tickets for ex-
pired registrations "but they are usually able to show that they are the 
owner listed on the expired registration."52 Because Jackson was not 
able to demonstrate ownership, it "heighten [ed] the suspicion that he 
had no legitimate connection to the car."53 Moreover, Judge Roberts 
believed: 
[F]inding the expired "real tags" would have provided police 
with additional evidence of criminal activity. . . . [T] he real 
tags would have ruled out the possibility the stolen tags were 
being used only to drive a vehicle that otherwise had no tags, 
making it more likely that the vehicle had been stolen. 54 
Second, asserting that "'a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic,' "55 Judge Roberts believed that Officer Garboe's history with 
stolen tags, which "confirmed that they, more often than not, led to 
real tags in the trunk," and the reported cases, which "confirm that 
criminals often use stolen tags on stolen cars," were "enough to sup-
port the officers' inferring from the stolen tags and the lack of any 
registration (current or expired) linking Jackson to the car that the 
car might well have been stolen."56 He added that "replacing a stolen 
vehicle's original tags makes sense: it prevents the vehicle from being 
readily identified as stolen by a passing police cruiser."57 Although a 
police officer could run those tags, "busy" police officers were unlikely 
to do so each time a Mercury Marquis was observed, "and people are 
likely to be much less diligent about reporting stolen tags-particu-
larly temporary ones-than stolen cars."58 
49. Id. at 102. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 102-03. 
52. Id. at 103. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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Third, as to the majority's claims that the officers lacked probable 
cause because only one of the majority's three possible explanations 
for the presence of the stolen tags on the car supported an inference 
of unauthorized use, Judge Roberts initially disagreed with the as-
sumption "that someone would run so great a risk [of putting a stolen 
tag on a vehicle] merely to avoid getting stopped for an expired regis-
tration."59 "The more serious problem" with the majority's approach, 
Judge Roberts believed: 
[I] s that probable cause does not depend on eliminating 
other innocent (or, here, less incriminating) explanations 
for a suspicious set of facts. Of course, considering alterna-
tive explanations is "often helpful," but the officers were not 
required, before searching the trunk, to negate the possibil-
ity that the stolen tags were used only to drive an unregis-
tered car. This is particularly so here, where any plausible 
explanation for the circumstances of Jackson's stop-the 
broken tag light, the stolen tags, Jackson's lack of registra-
tion, and the failure of the records check to connect Jackson 
with the vehicle-suggested that Jackson was deliberately try-
ing to conceal unlawful activity involving the car itself.60 
Fourth, Judge Roberts viewed the majority's suggestion that the po-
lice should have asked Jackson about the vehicle's ownership as "a 
hazardous approach to assessing probable cause."61 He believed that 
it "assumes that the officers had nothing better to do while on night 
patrol than linger roadside, tracking down exculpatory leads for sus-
pects."62 Instead, Judge Roberts believed that "[t]he officers could 
have reasonably concluded that further questioning would have 
yielded nothing more than the usual story any suspect in Jackson's 
situation would be expected to deliver," that is, his girlfriend owned 
the car.63 Judge Roberts asserted: "Sometimes a car being driven by 
an unlicensed driver, with no registration and stolen tags, really does 
belong to the driver's friend, and sometimes dogs do eat homework, 
but in neither case is it reasonable to insist on checking out the story 
before taking other appropriate action."64 Even if the police had con-
tactedJackson's girlfriend,Judge Roberts could not "see any conceiva-
ble value in the over-the-phone testimony of a suspect's apparent 
girlfriend-someone unknown to the officers, whose number was 
given to them by the suspect himself-that an unregistered car with 
stolen tags, driven by an unlicensed driver, was indeed hers and was 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 103-04 (quoting United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 
2003» (citation omitted). 
61. Id. at 104. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 105. 
64. Id. 
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being used with her permission."65 Finally, Judge Roberts maintained 
that the court had "neither the authority nor the expertise" to pre-
scribe "preferred investigative procedures for law enforcement" and 
that he "would leave the judgment as to what lines of inquiry ought to 
be pursued to the officer himself, and judge probable cause on the 
facts as they are, rather than on what they might have been had the 
officer pursued a different course."66 
C. United States v. Holmes 
In United States v. Holmes,67 Judge Roberts wrote an opinion for the 
court affirming the denial of a motion to suppress, based on a stop 
and frisk.68 Holmes's vehicle was speeding and police officers follow-
ing the vehicle observed Holmes "continually dipping his right shoul-
der, as if he were reaching under the driver's seat."69 Upon observing 
this, one of the police officers, Dereck Phillip, concluded that Holmes 
was either retrieving or placing a weapon under his seat. 70 As the of-
ficers approached the vehicle on foot after Holmes had stopped, 
Holmes was nervously looking over his shoulder, moving around in 
the vehicle, and reaching under his seat and toward his waist.71 Upon 
making contact with Holmes, the police detected "a strong odor of 
alcohol," and Holmes admitted that he had been drinking.72 After 
Holmes got out of the car, he reached several times toward the rear 
pocket of his pants, even after being directed by one of the officers 
not to do SO.73 The police believed he was armed.74 
Holmes was frisked and during the course of the pat-down, a 
"'hard,' 'square object'" was detected in the front pocket of the huge 
jacket he was wearing.75 Holmes told Phillip that it was a scale, and 
Phillip later testified that he thought it was a scale and not a firearm. 76 
Nonetheless, Phillip removed the object, confirmed that it was a scale, 
and "noticed a white residue on the scale.'>77 After Phillip resumed 
the pat-down, Holmes struck Phillip and "[a] melee ensued.',78 
Holmes was eventually restrained and arrested.79 Holmes, as well as 
his vehicle, was then searched, with a gun and cocaine among the 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
67. 385 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1388 (2005). 
68. [d. at 787. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 787-88. 
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incriminating evidence recovered; the gun was located under the 
driver's seat.80 
Holmes challenged the removal of the scale from his pocket as ex-
ceeding the scope of a permissible frisk and the recovery of the other 
evidence as a fruit of that alleged illegality.8l Recognizing that "[t]he 
propriety of a search ... depends on 'an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 
[Phillip] at the time,' and not on the officer's own subjective intent," 
Judge Roberts viewed the fact that Phillip believed that the item was a 
scale as not determining the inquiry.82 Instead, Judge Roberts rea-
soned, "[t]he only relevant question [was] whether a reasonable of-
ficer, knowing what Phillip knew at the moment of seizure, would 
have been justified in removing the scale."83 Concluding that the cir-
cumstances justified the removal of the object, Judge Roberts asserted 
that "the Fourth Amendment does not require the officer to gamble 
his safety and that of those around him on the accuracy of ... assump-
tions."84 Specifically, Phillip "did not have to take Holmes at his word 
that the object was a scale, and proceed with the frisk solely on that 
basis."85 He concluded: "We cannot fault the officer for taking the 
simple step of checking to ensure that the hard object was not some-
thing more threatening before continuing. The object did not feel 
like a firearm, but it could have been another type of weapon-a box 
cutter, for example."86 Because the permissible "scope of a Terry frisk 
is not limited to weapons, but rather to 'concealed objects which might 
be used as instruments of assault,''' Judge Roberts believed that the 
"'hard,' 'square' object" that Phillip felt "would seem to fit that 
description well."87 
D. The No opinion Cases: Riley, Moore, and Brown 
Two of the three cases that Judge Roberts joined without an opin-
ion were unremarkable applications of established case law to the 
facts. United States v. Riley88 was an appeal following a conviction for 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.89 The court of appeals, in 
an opinion by Stephen F. Williams, Senior CircuitJudge, held that the 
police had probable cause to arrest Riley, based on a combination of a 
reliable informant's tip and the police's confirmation of innocent de-
tails, and that the search of Riley was valid as a search incident to his 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 789. 




86. Id. at 790-91. 
87. Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968». 
88. 351 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
89. Id. at 1266. 
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arrest.90 United States v. Moore9l involved the appeal of the denial of a 
motion to suppress after conviction of Moore for being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm.92 In an opinion by Chief Judge Douglas H. Gins-
burg, the court of appeals held that, given the taxi's location and its 
erratic movements, there was reasonable suspicion that the driver was 
being robbed and this justified a stop of the taxicab in which Moore 
was a passenger.93 
The third case that Judge Roberts joined without opinion, United 
States v. Brown,94 involved a government appeal from the granting of a 
motion to suppress physical evidence found in a trunk of a vehicle.95 
Brown started as a valid traffic stop for speeding, but after it was estab-
lished that Brown did not have a valid District of Columbia driver's 
license, he was arrested.96 The officer then searched the passenger 
compartment incident to that arrest.97 During that search, several 
documents that the appellate court believed would have led an objec-
tive observer to conclude were fraudulent were found: driver's li-
censes, an American Express card, and a personal check.98 The 
officer then searched the trunk, believing that he could do so "inci-
dent to Brown's arrest."99 A firearm was recovered, which was the ba-
sis for Brown's prosecution for "possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon."loo 
The lower court properly recognized that the arrest did not author-
ize the search of the trunk; it granted suppression of the evidence in 
the trunk because the officer did not provide any testimony as to why 
he believed that there was probable cause to search the trunk. 101 In 
an opinion by Judge A. Raymond Randolph, the appellate court 
agreed that the police officer "misunderstood the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment."I02 But it also believed that the lower court 
erred in suppressing the evidence. lo3 Relying on precedent, Judge 
Randolph observed that the issue of whether an officer has probable 
cause to search a trunk is a purely objective standard, turning on 
whether "a 'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer'" under the 
circumstances presented, would have "believe[d] that there was a rea-
90. Id. at 1266-69. 
91. 394 F.3d 925 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
92. Id. at 926. 
93. Id. at 926-27, 930. 
94. 374 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cen. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1369 (2005). 
95. Id. at 1326. 
96. Id. at 1326-27. 
97. Id. at 1327. 
98. Id. at 1327-28. 




103. Id. at 1327-28. 
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sonable likelihood the trunk contained contraband."lo4 Applying that 
standard to the facts, Judge Randolph concluded that there was prob-
able cause to believe that the documents found in the passenger com-
partment were for the purpose of making fraudulent purchases. lo5 
Further, Randolph found "it is reasonable to assume that [Brown] 
had successfully accomplished his objective, which brings us to the 
trunk of the car."I06 Trunks are designed to store or conceal items; 
hence, Randolph believed that there was a "distinct possibility that the 
trunk contained earlier purchases."107 He therefore concluded that 
the search of the trunk was proper. 108 
E. Hedgepeth v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
In popular culture, it is perhaps the "french-fry" case for which 
Judge Roberts will be remembered based on his brief tenure on the 
court of appeals. In Hedgepeth v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority,109 12-year-old Ansche Hedgepeth was arrested for eating a 
french fry in a Metrorail station. I 10 Writing for the court, Judge Rob-
erts's opening lines properly framed the situation: 
No one is very happy about the events that led to this litiga-
tion. A twelve-year-old girl was arrested, searched, and hand-
cuffed. Her shoelaces were removed, and she was 
transported in the windowless rear compartment of a police 
vehicle to a juvenile processing center, where she was 
booked, fingerprinted, and detained until released to her 
mother some three hours later-all for eating a single french 
fry in a Metrorail station. The child was frightened, embar-
rassed, and crying throughout the ordeal. The district court 
described the policies that led to her arrest as "foolish," and 
indeed the policies were changed after those responsible en-
dured the sort of publicity reserved for adults who make 
young girls cry. The question before us, however, is not 
whether these policies were a bad idea, but whether they vio-
lated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. 
Like the district court, we conclude that they did not, and 
accordingly we affirm. III 
Putting aside the Fifth Amendment claim, which is beyond the pur-
pose of this discussion, Judge Roberts quickly turned to the recent 
104. [d. at 1328 (quoting United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 
1972». 
105. [d. at 1328-29. 
106. [d. at 1329. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
110. [d. at 1150-51. 
111. [d. at 1150. 
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Supreme Court opinion in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,112 where the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when an of-
ficer arrested a woman for violating a state statute that required all 
motorists and front-seat passengers to wear seatbelts. 113 In Atwater, it 
was a given that the officer had probable cause to arrest. Atwater, 
however, sought to restrict the ability of the police to arrest for minor 
offenses, such as seatbelt violations, and require that they instead issue 
citations in lieu of a custodial arrest. 114 The Atwater majority engaged 
in an extensive analysis of the history and policies underlying the 
Fourth Amendment. It ultimately concluded that the existence of 
probable cause was the core protection afforded by the Amendment 
in such circumstances and suggested that it was up to politically ac-
countable officials to impose limitations, if any, on the discretion of 
the police to arrest for minor crimes.115 
Mter summarizing the Atwater Court's analysis, Judge Roberts in 
Hedgepeth easily concluded that Atwater precluded the court from en-
gaging "in an evaluation of the reasonableness of the decision to ar-
rest Ansche, given the existence of probable cause."116 That was 
undoubtedly an accurate interpretation of Atwater, which was disposi-
tive of the claim before the court. Judge Roberts could have ended 
his opinion at that point. Instead, he went on and assumed that 
Atwater was "not controlling" and asserted: 
[Hedgepeth's] claim that a policy of mandatory arrest for 
certain minor offenses is unconstitutional boils down to an 
assertion that officer discretion is a necessary element of a 
valid seizure under the Fourth Amendment, at least for some 
minor offenses. She has not made an effort to defend that 
assertion under the usual first step of any analysis of whether 
particular government action violates the Fourth Amend-
ment-asking "whether the action was regarded as an unlaw-
ful search or seizure under the common law when the 
Amendment was framed." Moreover, insisting on the exer-
cise of discretion by an arresting officer would be an unfamil-
iar imperative under the Fourth Amendment. "The essential 
purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to 
impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of 
discretion by government officials .... " It is the high office 
of the Fourth Amendment to constrain law enforcement dis-
cretion; we see no basis for turning the usual Fourth Amend-
ment approach on its head and finding a government 
112. 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Hedgepeth, 386 F.3d at 1157. 
113. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323. 
114. See id. at 346-49. 
115. Id. at 352, 354. 
116. Hedgepeth, 386 F.3d at 1157-58. 
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practice unconstitutional solely because it lacks a sufficient 
role for discretionary judgment.1l7 
F. Stewart v. Evans 
199 
In Stewart v. Evans, Stewart, a federal employee, sued the Secretary 
of Commerce and two departmental employees, alleging discrimina-
tion.1lS Stewart claimed that the two employees, who were employed 
in the department's Office of General Counsel (OGC), had illegally 
searched her private documents pertaining to the discrimination com-
plaint, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 119 The documents had 
been turned over to other departmental officials to insure compliance 
with an unrelated Freedom of Information Act request and a later 
request from a United States Senator.120 In turning the documents 
over, Stewart obtained an agreement that OGC employees would not 
be allowed to view them.12l The documents were kept in a locked safe 
in another employee's office in the Special Matters Unit (SMU), 
which handled Congressional requests.122 Nonetheless, an employee 
of the OGC, acting at the direction of another OGC employee, 
opened the safe and reviewed the documents.123 The documents 
were later found responsive to the Congressional request and turned 
over to Congress.124 Mter her suit had been dismissed by the district 
court,125 the court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Roberts, 
held that Stewart did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the documents nor in the locked safe containing them.126 
Judge Roberts reasoned that Stewart "had no control whatever over 
access to the office containing the safe or to the safe itself."127 As to 
the documents, Judge Roberts reasoned that Stewart lost her expecta-
tion of privacy in them "because she had voluntarily relinquished con-
trol of them" when she "gave the documents to third parties."128 
Judge Roberts added: 
The reason Stewart transferred the documents is highly perti-
nent. In each instance her transfer was the first step in a 
process that could-and, in the case of the SMU review, 
did-result in broader disclosure of the documents, beyond 
even the third parties to whom Stewart conveyed them. 
117. [d. at 1159 (citation omitted). 
118. 351 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
119. [d. at 1241-42. 
120. [d. at 1241. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 1242. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 1244. 
127. [d. at 1243. 
128. [d. 
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When the threat of mandatory disclosure accompanies the 
transfer of documents to a third party, little reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy exists.129 
Finally, Judge Roberts rejected Stewart's argument that the agree-
ment she brokered, restricting access to the documents, preserved her 
expectation of privacy. Judge Roberts observed that the agreement 
was to allow for the review of the documents and "not to preserve 
their privacy more generally."130 He therefor~ concluded: "The 
Fourth Amendment protects privacy; it does not constitutionalize non-
disclosure agreements."131 Thus, he rejected Stewart's claim, relying 
on Supreme Court precedent that has established that "the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to 
a third party ... even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed."132 
II. OBSERVATIONS 
A. Probable Cause and Articulable Suspicion Determinations 
Judge Roberts has sat on four cases involving probable cause deter-
minations, ruling each time against the person seeking to suppress 
129. Id. at 1244 (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) 
("[T]here can be little expectation of privacy where records are [trans-
ferred] ... knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information 
therein is required .... "». 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976». There is a 
burgeoning amount of information held by third parties and used by law 
enforcement. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1089-1101 (2002) (cataloguing 
this development). Numerous commentators have argued for Fourth 
Amendment protections extending to information held by third parties. 
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Suroeillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 CEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1375, 1403-12 (2004) (arguing that there is a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in communications held by internet service providers). 
Some, as has Professor LaFave, distinguish between the type of information 
given to the third party and the purposes for which the third party has been 
given the information and conclude that a person may retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in some circumstances. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE § 2.6(f) (4th ed. 2004). There is a recent case, which is per-
haps a mere aberration, that indicates that the Court may adopt a similar 
analysis. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (finding 
a reasonable expectation of privacy by a patient in information conveyed to 
medical personnel and stating: "The reasonable expectation of privacy en-
joyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that 
the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel with-
out her consent."). Roberts, however, relied on Couch and Miller, which 
represent the Court's otherwise consistent view that persons who disclose 
information to third parties lose their expectation of privacy in that infor-
mation. Stewart, 351 F.3d at 1224; see Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Couch, 409 U.S. 
at 335-36. 
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evidence. 133 He sided with the court, without opinion, in Riley and 
Brown;134 he authored the opinion for a unanimous court in Law-
son;135 and he dissented inJackson.136 Clearly, Judge Roberts does not 
have a high standard for finding probable cause. Nor does his view of 
articulable suspicion, as evidenced by Moore and Holmes, appear to be 
particularly demanding. 137 Individualized suspicion,138 be it reasona-
ble suspicion or probable cause, requires, based on the whole picture, 
that the detaining officers have a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person stopped or arrested of criminal activ-
ity.139 The concept of probable cause is a familiar but fluid standard 
for a court to apply.140 "In dealing with probable cause ... , as the 
name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; 
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."141 The 
totality of the circumstances is taken into account to determine 
whether there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place."142 The divide in Jackson 
demonstrates that lower court judges continue to bring different per-
spectives to the analysis of probable cause.143 Indeed, many judges 
and legal scholars undoubtedly believe that Judge Roberts's probable 
133. See supra Parts l.A.-B., I.D. 
134. See supra Part I.D. 
135. See supra Part LA. 
136. See supra Part LB. 
137. See supra Parts I.C.-D. 
138. For the role that individualized suspicion plays in Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis, see Thomas K. Clancy, the Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 
2004 UTAH L. REv. 977 (2004); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized 
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. 
REv. 483 (1995). 
139. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (all of the factors 
justifYing a stop, examined separately, can be "quite consistent" with inno-
cent behavior but, when examined together, can still "amount to reasona-
ble suspicion"); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002) (stop 
of vehicle justified based on a combination of factors, all innocuous by 
themselves, but in combination sufficient to create articulable suspicion of 
drug smuggling). 
140. See generally Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable 
Cause, 74 MISS. LJ. 279 (2004) (comprehensively examining the concept of 
probable cause). 
141. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). Accord Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). The Supreme Court has rejected as-
signing a numerical marker for probable cause and, certainly, its concep-
tion of it has varied over time. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 
(1983) (not helpful to fix a "numerically precise degree of certainty" to 
probable cause determination but it is less than a preponderance standard 
only the probability); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (probable 
cause does not require fine tuning of evidence that even the "preponder-
ance standard demands"). 
142. Gates, 462 U.S. at 23B. 
143. See supra Part I.B. 
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cause threshold, as articulated in Jackson, is set too low. 144 However, 
his methodology and conclusions in Jackson are more in tune with the 
current Supreme Court's analysis than the majority and concurring 
opinions. Indeed, the Supreme Court repeatedly has examined indi-
vidualized suspicion cases in recent decades and those opinions-
often unanimous-demonstrate that the probable cause145 and rea-
sonable suspicion standards146 are not high barriers. This is to say 
that Judge Roberts's probable cause analysis fits comfortably with the 
Supreme Court's current collective view. 
Courts permit police officers, based on their training and experi-
ence, to make logical inferences from the information known and 
courts give deference to a police officer's evaluation of the circum-
stances. 147 Judge Rogers in her opinion in Jackson, as well as Judge 
Edwards in his concurring opinion, did not defer to the police's ex-
pertise or conclusions; instead, those opinions reflect an intense scru-
tiny of the facts, with reliance on their own possible innocent 
explanations to overcome incriminating inferences, serving to defeat 
the police's conclusions that there was probable cause to search. If 
that mode of analysis is imposed on the police, they would in many 
instances be paralyzed; they are investigators, not adjudicators. Judge 
Roberts, in rejecting the majority's analysis, is more in tune with estab-





See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REpORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN G. ROBERTS 
TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 88 (2005), available at http://www. 
supremecourtwatch.org/robertsprehearing.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,2005). 
See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369, 371-72 (2003) (police had 
probable cause to arrest all the occupants of a car in which drugs and a roll 
of cash were found in the passenger compartment after all the occupants 
denied possession). 
The reasonable suspicion standard, required for a stop, is less demanding 
than that for probable cause but the Court has never identified that quan-
tum of suspicion needed with any precision. See, e.g., United States v. Soko-
low, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Nonetheless, the Court has repeatedly held that 
the amount of information available to the officer at the time of a stop 
need not be great. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) 
(unprovoked flight of suspect in high crime area); United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002) (stop of vehicle justified based on a combina-
tion of factors, all innocuous by themselves, but in combination sufficient 
to create articulable suspicion of drug smuggling). But see Florida v. J.L., 
529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) (anonymous tip insufficient to justifY stop). 
See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). The Ornelas 
court pointed out that reviewing courts should give deference both to trial 
courts and to police officers' inferences drawn from the facts surrounding 
an encounter by saying: 
Id. 
A trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the 
distinctive features and events of the community; likewise, a police 
officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and 
expertise. The background facts provide a context for the histori-
cal facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve 
deference. 
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cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal ac-
tivity, not an actual showing of such activity .... [and] therefore, inno-
cent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of 
probable cause."148 
The application of an objective standard149 to uphold the police 
actions, as employed in Brown and Holmes, may appear inconsistent 
with the principle that courts should defer to the police's evaluation 
of the circumstances. Indeed, in both of those cases the police had 
actual beliefs that undermined the rationales for the searches: in 
Brown, the officer mistakenly believed that he could search the trunk 
incident to arrest;150 in Holmes, the officer believed that the hard ob-
ject he was touching during the pat-down was a scale and not a 
weapon. 151 However, the officer's mistake in Brown was one of law, 
that is, whether he could permissibly search the trunk incident to 
Brown's arrest. 152 There was no dispute as to the underlying facts and 






Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). Also consistent with Rob-
erts's view in Jackson, the Supreme Court has not dictated the manner in 
which the police must conduct an investigation. Instead, the police actions 
are merely measured for their reasonableness. See United States v. Montoya 
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1985) ("[C] reative judges engaged in 
post hoc evaluations of police conduct can almost always imagine some alter-
native means by which the objectives of the police might have been accom-
plished." (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,686-87 (1985))). 
Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) (a Terry investigation "at 
close range" requires the officer to make a "quick decision as to how to 
protect himself and others from possible danger" and there is no require-
ment "that officers adopt alternative means to ensure their safety in order 
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter" (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,24,28 (1968))). 
On the level of individual encounters of the police and citizens, one of the 
main principles of Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on examining the 
objective aspects of the encounter and not by inquiry into the officer's ac-
tual, subjective intent to determine if the police intrusions were justified. 
See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-14 (1996) (collecting 
cases and rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges based on officers' actual 
motivations); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989) (inquiry 
into subjective intent inappropriate); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 
575 n.7 (1988) ("[T]he subjective intent of the officers is relevant to an 
assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct only 
to the extent that intent has been conveyed to the person confronted."); 
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (Fourth Amendment viola-
tion is objective inquiry and does not depend on the officer's state of 
mind); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (emphasizing exam-
ination of officers' actions and not their state of mind); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (for search incident to arrest, it does 
not matter that officer did not subjectively fear suspect or believe that the 
suspect might be armed). 
United States v. Brown, 374 F.3d 1326, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 1369 (2005). 
United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786, 788, 790 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. de-
nied, 125 S. Ct. 1388 (2005). 
Brown, 374 F.3d at 1327. 
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those facts; that is, the search was justified by probable cause to believe 
that evidence of a crime would be located in the trunk. No deference 
to the police's evaluation of the law was required or merited. 
The situation in Holmes, however, was much different. In that case, 
the appellate court substituted its factual conclusions for those of the 
police officer. That is not a proper application of an objective analysis 
of the events-it is a rewriting of the events. In Holmes, as a matter of 
fact, Officer Phillip concluded that the object he was feeling in 
Holmes' pocket was not a firearm but was a scale. 153 He had a sound 
basis for that conclusion: his previous observations of Holmes had led 
Phillip to conclude that Holmes might be "armed;"154 Phillip's own 
tactile examination of Holmes informed him that the object was not a 
gun but a '''hard,' 'square' object"; and when Holmes said the object 
was a scale, Phillip's sense of touch led him to conclude that the ob-
ject was a scale.155 Judge Roberts, instead of crediting that factual 
conclusion, essentially rejected it and asserted that a reasonable of-
ficer in Phillip's situation would have been justified in removing the 
object to ascertain what the object was.156 This mode of analysis is not 
only inconsistent with Judge Roberts's own position in Jackson but also 
with Supreme Court authority, both of which acknowledge that courts 
should defer to the factual conclusions of police officers and the logi-
cal inferences from those conclusions. Applied to Holmes, this mode 
of analysis means that the court was faced with a situation where the 
officer actually believed he was touching a scale, not a weapon. 
It is difficult to extrapolate from that actual belief of Phillip to an 
objective analysis that would have justified the removal of the object. 
One must seriously question Judge Roberts's conclusion that a reason-
able police officer in Phillip's position would have believed that the 
"'hard,' 'square' object" might be a weapon. Phillip was looking for a 
gun, based on his observations of Holmes's activities prior to and dur-
ing the stop, and his conclusions about those actions. 157 Phillip knew 
that the object he was touching was not a gun; he had no reason to 
suspect that Holmes had any other weapons; and he thought that the 
object was a scale.158 It seems untenable that a reasonable officer 
under the circumstances would conclude that the object was possibly a 
weapon. 
B. The Scope of a Permissible Frisk 
There is a second, more fundamental reason to question Judge 
Roberts's decision in Holmes: he misapprehended the permissible 
153. Holmes, 385 F.3d at 788. 
154. Id. at 787-88. 
155. Id. at 788. 
156. Id. at 790. 
157. Id. at 787-88. 
158. Id. at 790. 
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scope of a Terry 159 frisk. A frisk, that is, a protective search of suspects 
for weapons, is a limited intrusion designed solely to insure the safety 
of the police officer and others while the officer is conducting a crimi-
nal investigation. 160 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a 
protective search is "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the per-
son, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resent-
ment"161 and that such an intrusion is "an annoying, frightening, and 
perhaps humiliating experience."162 On the other hand, the Court 
has also recognized the importance of the "immediate interest of the 
police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with 
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpect-
edly and fatally be used against him."163 
A protective search is justified when an officer has articulable suspi-
cion that the person detained is armed and dangerous.164 However, 
"[t]he manner in which [a] ... search [is] conducted is ... [just] as 
vital a part of the inquiry as whether [it is] warranted at all."165 A 
protective search for weapons must be "confined in scope to an intru-
sion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hid-
den instruments for the assault of the police officer."166 "If the 
protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the 
suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry."167 
Thus, for example, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, a police officer de-
tected no weapon-like objects during the course of a "patdown search" 
of the front of the suspect's body.168 The frisk did reveal, however, "a 
small lump" in the suspect's pocket.169 Mter" 'squeezing, sliding and 
otherwise manipulating'" the lump, the officer concluded that it was 
crack cocaine and retrieved it from the pocket.170 The Court found 
the search constitutionally invalid,l71 reasoning that, "[a]lthough the 
officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in respondent'S 
pocket, because Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respon-
dent's jacket," the officer exceeded the scope of a Terry search after 
concluding that the object was not a weapon. 172 
159. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
160. Id. at 29-30. 
161. Id. at 17. 
162. Id. at 24. 
163. Id. at 23. 
164. Id. at 24. 
165. Id. at 28. 
166. Id. at 29. 
167. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
168. Id. at 369. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 378 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), affd, 
508 U.S. 366 (1993)). 
171. Id. at 378-79. 
172. Id. at 379. 
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There are several interrelated considerations that measure the 
proper scope of a protective search. 173 Two are relevant to the Holmes 
fact pattern. The first is the level of assurance the police may obtain 
in satisfying themselves that the suspect they are confronting is not 
armed. As discussed elsewhere, "an officer may be only reasonably 
assured that the person the officer is confronting is not armed; this is 
to say that the police must accept some uncertainty when confronting 
suspects."174 To permit the officer to obtain certainty or a high de-
gree of confidence that the person is not armed would allow the most 
intrusive of searches, akin to a search incident to arrest. Such a rule 
eliminates the structure that Terry sought to create: for arrests, based 
on probable cause, a full search; for stops, based on articulable suspi-
cion, a more limited intrusion to protect the police during their inves-
tigation. This two-level structure was designed to correlate the need 
to intrude with the degree of intrusion, thereby preventing unjustified 
intrusions into a person's security. 
Thus, Terry contemplated a more limited intrusion than 
would be obtained if complete assurance were the goal. The 
level of justification for an investigatory stop also points to 
the conclusion that the police may not obtain absolute assur-
ance that the person is not armed. Investigative stops are 
justified by reasonable suspicion that the person has or is 
about to commit a crime and a protective search is similarly 
justified if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the sus-
pect is armed and dangerous. Thus, the State's interest or its 
need here is not as great as in the search incident to arrest 
situation. Accordingly, the officer's level of assurance that 
the person is not armed should be analogous to the justifica-
tion for the protective search. It follows that an officer must 
accept some uncertainty whether the person he is con-
fronting is armed; he can be only reasonably assured that the 
suspect is not armed. 175 
A second factor refers to limits on the types of weapons for which a 
search can be made. Weapons come in a variety of forms and sizes. 
In a world where technological innovation continues to confound 
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, the police may in the fu-
ture be confronted with danger from small but deadly weapons. That 
is not, however, the situation typically faced by the police today, nor is 
there any reason to believe that Officer Phillip was faced with that 
situation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that, through-
out the long tradition of armed violence by American criminals that 
173. See Thomas K. Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of a 
Permissible Intrusion to Ascertain if a Detained Person is Anned, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 
491,525-32 (1999). 
174. Id. at 525. 
175. Id. at 527. 
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has resulted in the deaths and injuries of many law enforcement of-
ficers in the line of duty, "[v]irtually all of these deaths and a substan-
tial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives."176 This 
raises the question of whether the police should be routinely allowed 
to satisfY themselves that the person accosted does not have any weap-
ons, even a razor blade. Some courts permit such searches but others 
do not.177 
Some courts "condone fanciful speculation" on this point. 
Illustrative are cases holding that an object thought to be a 
cigarette lighter may be searched for because "it could be 
used in a doubled up fist as a punch or thrown at the officer 
or used to bum the officer or the police unit," that a soft 
object may be searched for because it might be "a rubber 
water pistol loaded with carbolic acid or some other liquid, 
which if used by a suspect could permanently blind an of-
ficer," and that an object thought to be a shotgun shell could 
be searched for because it could be detonated by a sharp 
object and the suspect "might want to explode the shell even 
in a way which might entail considerable personal risk to 
himself."178 
Professor LaFave correctly observes that decisions of this type are 
unsound. He maintains that the correct view "reflects two ... sensible 
considerations: (1) To allow a search for anything which could under 
some circumstances be employed as a weapon would be to permit a 
search" not dissimilar in intensity from a search incident to arrest;179 
and" (2) [i] n determining what objects might be a weapon, considera-
tion must be given to what types of objects could be employed in the 
setting of the particular case."180 To these considerations a third 
should be added, that is, the principle that an officer may obtain only 
reasonable assurance that the person is not armed. 
176. Id. at 495 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,23-24 (1968». Since Terry was 
decided, the danger for police in the line of duty has drastically increased. 
See United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1994) (reporting 
that since Terry, the number of police officers killed annually in the line of 
duty has tripled and the number of those assaulted and wounded have 
risen by a factor of twenty), cen. denied, 513 U.S. 829 (1994). See also Mary-
land v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (noting that "traffic stops may be 
dangerous encounters" and that "[iJn 1994 alone, there were 5,762 officer 
assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops"). 
177. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6(c) (4th ed. 2004). 
178. Id. at 665 (citations omitted) (referencing situations from California cases 
regarding these issues). 
179. Id. See also United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520, 522 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972) 
("To take an extreme example, a razor blade could readily be sewn into 
clothing, and so support a purported limited search for weapons which in-
cluded shredding a suspect's clothing or dismantling his shoes."). 
180. LaFave, supra note 177, § 9.6(c) at 666. 
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Thus, on the one hand, when an officer has particular information 
about the nature of the weapon carried by the suspect but none as to 
its location, a fairly intrusive search would be permitted if the weapon 
were small. I8 ! For example, if an officer is confronting a person rea-
sonably suspected of using a razor blade as a weapon, then a careful 
examination to locate that object is justified. 182 On the other hand, 
when an officer has no specific information about the possible loca-
tion of a weapon on the suspect or any information about the type of 
weapon the suspect may have, the search must be limited to fairly 
large objects such as guns and knives. I83 Thus, when an officer, dur-
ing the course of a protective search, discovers a matchbox, even 
though such boxes "could hold a razor blade," he has no right to 
open it absent any information that the suspect is carrying such a 
weapon. I84 In concluding that an officer exceeded the permissible 
scope of a protective search when the officer examined the contents 
of a man's wallet, one judge has reasoned that 
in this case there were no circumstances which would sup-
port a reasonable belief that what the officer felt with his 
hand contained a weapon. True, it might, and possibly 
could, contain a very small but potentially lethal weapon. 
Nevertheless, it was an innocuous and ordinary size common 
men's wallet without any bulge or other telltale sign, resting 
in a commonly located place. The limited authority to in-
trude ... in a frisk, when the police do not yet have probable 
cause, covers objects which may be weapons but not objects 
which possibly could contain weapons. If that were the law, 
then an officer could reach in and retrieve any item which 
felt like a container, including anybody's wallet, because 
even a very small container could harbor a razor blade.185 
181. Id. at 665-68. 
182. Cf State v. Williams, 544 N.W.2d 350, 351-54 (Neb. 1996) (police officers 
permitted to force open clinched fist of suspect to determine if she had a 
razor blade or small knife when investigating report of boy that his mother 
was being beaten by suspects armed with knives). 
183. See, e.g., United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1998) (per-
missible to remove object from sock when, during frisk of suspect, officer 
encountered hard object of "approximately the same size and shape as a 
box cutter with a sharp blade, which is often used as a weapon"); State v. 
Ashbrook, 586 N.w.2d 503, 508-09 (S.D. 1998) (officer acted within scope 
of protective search when he examined containers in car that were large 
enough and heavy enough to hold a weapon but did not look into smaller 
containers). 
184. But see Jackson v. State, 804 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (police 
officer could seize contraband in matchbox after arrest of suspect based on 
reasonable cause to believe felony had been committed). 
185. State v. Newton, 489 S.E.2d 147, 152-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (Beasley, j., 
concurring). See also State v. Crook, 485 N.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992) (removal of hat without first "pat search[ing]" to search for 
razor blade or other small weapon improper); People v. Collins, 463 P.2d 
403, 406 (Cal. 1970) (cannot exceed the scope of a lawful pat-down upon 
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This judge's reasoning reflects an analysis of the proper considera-
tions that govern the scope of a protective search. An officer can only 
achieve reasonable assurance that the suspect is not armed. Absent 
information that the suspect utilizes razor blades or another small 
weapon, the officer must accept some uncertainty that the suspect 
may be harboring a small weapon. The police cannot search small 
containers or other areas based on the speculation that it might con-
tain a small or atypical weapon absent any information that the sus-
pect is armed with such a weapon. Otherwise, the balance struck by 
Terry would be eliminated and a protective search would be no differ-
ent in intensity than a search incident to arrest. 
In Holmes, it was a given that the police were faced with a suspect 
that they reasonably believed was armed and dangerous. Is6 Under 
Terry, the police officers were entitled to conduct a frisk of Holmes to 
protect themselves. IS7 But accepting that premise does not mean that 
they could go into Holmes's pocket. At the time that Phillip was 
about to remove the hard object, Phillip knew the following: the 
"'hard,' 'square' object" was not a gun; he thought it was a scale. ISS 
Judge Roberts reasoned as follows that its removal was within the valid 
scope of a Terry frisk: "The object did not feel like a firearm, but it 
could have been another type of weapon-a box cutter, for exam-
ple."Is9 Phillip had no reason to believe that Holmes had any such 
unusual weapon; under the circumstances, the proper scope of the 
frisk should have been limited to that necessary to locate the usual 
weapons to assault police officers. Judge Roberts, instead, permitted 
an intrusion based on observing that the object "might' be used as a 
weapon. I90 Such speculative reasoning is inconsistent with the proper 
scope of a frisk; to hold otherwise, permits general exploratory 
searches, effectively obliterating the distinction between the limited 
intrusion authorized by a Terry frisk and a search. 
C. Departures from Lower Courts' Legal Analysis to Uphold the Search 
Judge Roberts demonstrated a willingness to depart from the lower 
court's reasoning in Lawson and in Jackson to uphold the search. 
Many courts would not engage in such analysis, finding instead that 
speculation that object might be a razor blade or other atypical weapon 
because, to do so, "would render meaningless Teny's requirement that pat-
downs be limited in scope absent articulable grounds for an additional 
intrusion.") . 
186. United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786,790 (D.C. Cir. 2004), em. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 1388 (2005). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 79l. 
190. Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968)). 
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the claim is unpreserved. l9l Nonetheless, it is within the court's dis-
cretion to address unpreserved legal arguments, so long as there is no 
dispute of the relevant facts. 192 In Lawson, the government raised the 
issue for the first time on appeal and the appellant replied on the 
merits, asserting that there was no probable cause to search based on 
the facts developed at the hearing. 193 Given that the appellant in Law-
son discussed the merits in his reply brief, it is perhaps less trouble-
some that Judge Roberts did also. On the other hand, such an 
approach left the Jackson court divided over unclear facts. 194 Al-
though few firm conclusions can be drawn, these cases may signal a 
willingness by Chief Justice Roberts on the Supreme Court to go be-
yond the arguments of the parties and the reasoning of lower courts 
to superimpose his legal reasoning in cases before the Court. 
D. Measuring Reasonableness 
"The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that 
searches and seizures be reasonable."195 This term is not self-defin-
191. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 334 Md. 178, 187-91, 638 A.2d 107, 112-14 (1994) 
(collecting cases and discussing waiver of claim at suppression hearing 
based on State's failure to argue probable cause ground). 
192. See United States v. Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (may affirm 
on grounds other than those presented and relied on below). 
193. United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d 735, 740 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
194. Because Jackson did not argue in the district court that the police should 
have conducted a more elaborate investigation, the lower court did not 
make any factual finding as to when the suspect told the officers that the 
car belonged to his girlfriend. Judge Roberts cited the following sections of 
the hearing transcript: 
Compare Hr'g Tr., June 9, 2003, at 62 ("I don't recall exactly when 
the conversation took place in which he . . . informed us that his 
girlfriend had purchased the vehicle at an auction.") (redirect of 
Officer Garboe) with id. at 70 (Q. "Did you have any information 
regarding this defendant or anyone else's possible ownership of 
this particular vehicle prior to the search?" A. "No.") (Officer 
Johnson). 
United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 105 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts,]. 
dissenting). Roberts concluded from these excerpts that Jackson's com-
ments came after the search. 
However, Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion, relied on the ex-
planation Jackson gave to the officers that he had borrowed the recently 
purchased car from his girlfriend as undercutting the justification for the 
search of the trunk. Id. at 100 (Edwards,]., concurring). To have rele-
vance, that explanation had to have occurred prior to the search. Edwards 
cited no record support for his view. Although it appears that Judge Rob-
erts's conclusion as to when the search occurred had stronger support in 
the record, the varying opinions of the two judges points to one reason why 
many courts would remand for factual findings in lieu of reliance on ambig-
uous records to support a ground not articulated by the lower court. 
195. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
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ing.196 "The methods by which the courts address this challenge will 
largely determine how much liberty we have and how much the gov-
ernment can intrude."197 As recently observed,198 in Wyoming v. 
Houghton,199 the Court articulated a two-step model for measuring rea-
sonableness: first, the Court inquired "whether the action was re-
garded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when 
the Amendment was framed;" and, second, if "that inquiry yields no 
answer," the search or seizure is evaluated "under traditional stan-
dards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests."2oo The Houghton test is an odd combination: if it 
yields an answer, the common law at the time the Amendment was 
framed, which was in 1791, is dispositive;201 if not, the balancing test is 
196. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (quoting United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, j., dissenting), 
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969): 
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some 
criterion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for 
district judges or the police to say that an 'unreasonable search' is 
forbidden-that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of 
reason which makes a search reasonable? 
197. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 
UTAH L. REv. 977, 1043 (2004). 
198. See id. at 1014-15. 
199. 526 U.S. 295 (1999). See generally Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why 
the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. 
L. REv. 895 (2002) (discussing Houghton and the Court's inconsistent and 
selective use of history). 
200. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-300. In Houghton, the Court was confronted with 
the question "whether police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when 
they search a passenger's personal belongings inside an automobile that 
they have probable cause to believe contains contraband." Id. at 297. In 
answering that question, the Court first turned to the common law inquiry 
mandated by its new test. Based on founding era authorities, the Court 
concluded that "the historical evidence [showed] that the Framers would 
have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless 
search of containers within an automobile." Id. at 300. The Court went on 
to apply the balancing test as an alternative means of reaching the same 
result. Id. at 303-07. Four Justices rejected the majority'S model of reasona-
bleness. See id. at 307 (Breyer, j., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion 
with the understanding that history is meant to inform, but not automati-
cally to determine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question."); id. at 
311 n.3 (Stevens, j., dissenting, joined by Souter, j. and Ginsburg, j., dis-
senting) ("To my knowledge, we have never restricted ourselves to a two-
step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and governmental 
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law 
'yields no answer.'''). 
201. The first part of Houghton implements Justice Scalia's strongly held view 
that bases Fourth Amendment interpretation on the common law. See Cali-
fornia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1991) (Scalia,j., concurring) (pro-
posing that "the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
affords the protection that the common law afforded" but adding "that 
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used to evaluate the relative weights of contemporary governmental 
needs and individual interests. 
In prior cases, the Supreme Court had often relied on the common 
law as a guide to ascertain the meaning of Fourth Amendment princi-
ples. Exacdy how that tool has been used, as with other interpretative 
techniques, varied with who wrote the opinion.202 However, Hough-
ton's dispositive reliance on the common law as defining reasonable-
ness where it yields an answer had never been used before in a Fourth 
Amendment case.203 "Also, contrary to Houghton, the historical abuses 
that prompted the Amendment were more important to the Framers 
than the common law search and seizure requirements, with the only 
notable exception being the common law search warrant, which 
served as the model for the Warrant Clause.''204 Moreover, using the 
common law as the measure of reasonableness is distinct from using 
the common law as the measure of the Framers' intent. As to the 
former, the common law rule as of 1791 defines what is reasonable. As 
to the latter, the common law is consulted to ascertain the Framers' 
intent, which is in turn used to justify reliance on some conception of 
reasonableness. 
Judge Roberts in Hedgepeth cited Houghton as setting forth the first 
step in the test for reasonableness. Did he do so because he felt 
changes in the surrounding legal rules (for example, elimination of the 
common law rule that reasonable, good-faith belief was no defense to abso-
lute liability to trespass), may make a warrant indispensable to reasonable-
ness where it once was not") (citation omitted); County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the balancing test applies to "novel questions of search and seizure" but not 
to "resolving those questions on which a clear answer already existed in 
1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever 
since") . 
202. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (the Court is 
"guided by" common law in ascertaining the meaning of reasonableness); 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984) (While "[t]he common 
law may guide consideration of what areas are protected by the Fourth 
Amendment," common law rights are not co-incident with the Fourth 
Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980) (common law 
view utilized to shed light on Framers' intent); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 114 (1975) (common law acts as a guide to interpret Fourth Amend-
ment). See also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: 
Viewing the Supreme Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 
1387,1397-99 (2003) (observing that the Court's use of "history" is one type 
of rhetorical argument that the Court has selectively used in its decisions). 
203. Cf Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (stating 
that the balancing test would apply" [a] t least in a case such as this, where 
there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of 
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted"); 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (utilizing supervisory 
powers over the federal courts and reversing conviction based on the po-
lice's failure to comply with the common law requirement to announce 
their purpose for demanding admission). 
204. See generally Clancy, supra note 197, at 978-90, 1014-15. 
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bound by it? If so, he ignored many other cases utilizing much differ-
ent models of "reasonableness" analysis, each of which remain via-
ble.205 Or did he cite it because he accepts it as the proper measure of 
reasonableness? If the latter is true, then his presence on the Court 
will significantly shift the grounding of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. He would join Justices Scalia and Thomas in affording disposi-
tive weight to the common law. Justice O'Connor, albeit not a model 
of consistency in her Fourth Amendment analysis,206 was generally in 
the camp that viewed the common law as illuminating the Framer's 
intent and not dispositive of an issue; she was an advocate for the cen-
tral role of individualized suspicion as an element of a search or 
seizure.207 She also wrote a dissent in Atwater, joined by three other 
justices, wherein she reasoned in part that "history is just one of the 
tools [the Court] use[s] in conducting the reasonableness inquiry."208 
Thus, if Judge Roberts were in the "common law is dispositive" camp, 
this would represent a strengthening of the view of the Fourth 
Amendment that is, in my view, incorrect and, at bottom, unwork-
able.209 On the other hand, Judge Roberts in Hedgepeth did not quote 
the second part of the Houghton test, that is, that if the common law 
did not yield an answer, the Court would employ a balancing test to 
assess reasonableness. Instead, Judge Roberts looked to the "essential 
purpose" of the Fourth Amendment, which is "to impose a standard 
of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government of-
ficials."210 Was this language just a balm; it was, after all, pure dicta. 
Or does it reflect his possible rejection of balancing and, instead, use 
of other tools to ascertain reasonableness? Perhaps Chief Justice Rob-
erts will view the reasonableness inquiry as neither a divining of the 
state of the common law as of 1791 nor as an unprincipled balancing 
of competing interests. Perhaps, in looking for the "essential pur-
205. See generally Clancy, supra note 197, at 1022-26 (discussing the Court's rea-
sonableness models and observing that the Court has failed to establish a 
hierarchy among them). 
206. She joined the majority in Houghton, which set forth the common law as the 
dispositive first step in reasonableness analysis. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 
526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). But in Atwater, as discussed in the text, she 
asserted that the common law was but one tool in that assessment. See 
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, j. dissenting); supra note 202 and ac-
companying text. 
207. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47], 515 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, j., dissenting) 
(noting that "the individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree 
as old as the Fourth Amendment itself'). 
208. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). 
209. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and the Common Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1739 (2000) (arguing that the recent cases of the 
Supreme Court utilizing the common law as the principal criterion for as-
sessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures are "faithful neither to 
the text of the Amendment nor to what we know of its intent"). 
210. Hedgepeth v. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979». 
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pose" of the Amendment, he will see that process as "a weighted in-
quiry: one starts with a conception of what reasonableness is [;] [i] t is 
a search or seizure based on objective criteria."211 To find such crite-
ria, history is a vital tool, but it must be properly used to ascertain the 
Framers' values and not to enshrine specific common law practices.212 
Moreover, in seeking to constrain official discretion, Judge Roberts 
may look to the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which 
has demonstrated the need to retain objective standards.213 Indeed, 
the Court's other methods of assessing reasonableness have failed to 
provide meaningful guidance and to protect individuals from ever-ex-
panding governmental intrusions.214 "In the end, however, the 
Court's judgment should be informed by the fundamental purpose of 
the Amendment: protecting individual security from unreasonable 
governmental invasion. "215 
III. CONCLUSION 
So what conclusions can we draw from Judge Roberts's record? In 
each case, Judge Roberts sided with the government. In each case, he 
relied on established precedent to ground his legal analysis. His opin-
ions are tightly reasoned, often steering close to the line set by prece-
dent. This is what intermediate appellate judges should do. 
Certainly, some will disagree with him, based on the facts, whether a 
particular action was justified. However, with the notable exception of 
Holmes,Judge Roberts's view of the law was well grounded in Supreme 
Court precedent to support it, particularly more recent Supreme 
Court cases. Judge Roberts's record discloses a willingness-perhaps 
even an eagerness-to depart from the reasoning of the lower courts 
to uphold the governmental actions. The cases give significant insight 
as to Judge Roberts's views on probable cause-including how weighty 
that standard is and what tools should be employed to measure it. 
Yet, much is unknown. How will Chief Justice Roberts address the 
fundamental issues that will come before him about the Fourth 
Amendment: what is the proper definition of a search, a seizure, or 
how to measure reasonableness; what impact should technology have 
on those definitions and, consequently, individual rights; what role 
does privacy have in defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment's 
guarantee of security; and what is the proper scope of the exclusion-
ary rule in enforcing Fourth Amendment protections? 
211. Clancy, supra note 197, at 1043. 
212. See Clancy, supra note 197, at 1027-28. 
213. Clancy, supra note 197, at 1027-28. 
214. Clancy, supra note 197, at 1027-28. 
215. Clancy, supra note 197, at 1044. 
